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THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S PROTECTION SCOPE OVER SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION: A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS
By Mercedes Bugallo
Bachelor of Philosophy 2012
This thesis provides an in-depth legal analysis of the protection status granted to minority 
groups by the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment. It sets forth a thorough 
definition of what a suspect class is and an explanation of its requirements, with the final aim of 
analyzing sexual orientation within the boundaries of such definition. There are four main points 
to consider when identifying a suspect class: a history of purposeful discrimination, political 
powerlessness, an immutable and uncontrollable trait, and incorrect stereotypes. If all the indicia 
of suspectness are met then the group is considered a suspect class and if only some of the 
criteria are met then it is considered a Quasi-suspect class. This thesis will prove that sexual 
orientation is at least a Quasi-suspect class by fulfilling most of the requirements in an above-
satisfactory fashion, although the argument could perfectly be made for full-suspectness status if 
the Court were to find them all sufficient. It also comprehensively compares U.S. court cases 
throughout, and finally presents a side-by-side review of U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions on 
gender and sexual orientation.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
The plight of homosexuals and their struggle for equality and protection in the United 
States is one of the most formidable and intriguing cultural, legal and social issues to strike this 
country in the past century. There is a stark contrast between the socially liberal America well-
known as the “the melting pot” of cultures and home to acceptance to diversity, as opposed to 
narrow-minded political system that seems to deprive groups of citizens of equal rights. Why is it 
then that in the past recent years the Supreme Court has been unusually adamant to provide 
heightened protection to such groups as homosexuals? Their reluctant behavior, whichever the 
cause, does not only promote the stereotype that homosexuals are not worth the protection 
against discrimination on a legal basis but they also don’t deserve it from a moral stance on 
human rights.
Long considered by the masses as deviants or undesirables, homosexuals are finally able 
to stand up for themselves and fight the system that once deemed them mentally ill1 for simply 
choosing a love and/or life partner that shared the same gender at birth. 
                                                       
1 Before 1970, the American Psychological Association took the stance that homosexuality was 
considered a psychological disease. This was rectified in 1973. [Adopted by the American 
Psychological Association Council of Representatives on January 24-26, 1975]
a). The American Psychological Association supports the action taken on December 15, 1973, by the 
American Psychiatric Association, removing homosexuality from that Association's official list of 
mental disorders. The American Psychological Association therefore adopts the following 
resolution: Homosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or 
general social and vocational capabilities; Further, the American Psychological Association urges all 
mental health professionals to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness that has long 
been associated with homosexual orientations.
b). Regarding discrimination against homosexuals, the American Psychological Association adopts 
the following resolution concerning their civil and legal rights: The American Psychological 
Association deplores all public and private discrimination in such areas as employment, housing, 
public accommodation, and licensing against those who engage in or have engaged in homosexual 
activities and declares that no burden of proof of such judgment, capacity, or reliability shall be 
placed upon these individuals greater than that imposed on any other persons. Further, the 
2Nowadays, according to the American Heritage Medical Dictionary, sexual orientation is 
defined as “The direction of one's sexual interest toward members of the same, opposite, or both 
sexes, especially a direction seen to be dictated by physiologic rather than sociologic forces.”2
Currently, the United States has no federal legal protection for citizens that identify with such a 
medical term. At a state level the government has the freedom to establish and enforce laws 
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but as long as there is no overreaching 
national law then those state decisions are vulnerable to countless appeals. The ongoing battle 
between state and federal jurisdiction and the cycle of rulings on this important issue will not be 
resolved as long as both levels of the law are not in agreement.
Sexual orientation protection has been a particularly controversial issue in America for 
the past half century and it has awakened a number of theories and arguments from both 
supporters and oppositions. As society becomes more aware of the injustices that this group has 
endured through the years, a revolutionizing movement has grown and advanced to acquire legal 
protection for homosexuals. There are many ways this kind of protection could be adopted, but 
the most clear and permanent option seems to be changing the manner in which the Supreme 
Court analyzes their level of protection under the fifth and fourteenth amendment. By changing 
the Court’s precedent, homosexuals can claim equal protection under the Equal Protection and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
American Psychological Association supports and urges the enactment of civil rights legislation at 
the local, and state and federal level that would offer citizens who engage in acts of homosexuality 
the same protections now guaranteed to others on the basis of race, creed, color, etc. Further, the 
American Psychological Association supports and urges the repeal of all discriminatory legislation 
singling out homosexual acts by consenting adults in private (Conger, 1975, p. 633).
Reference: Conger, J.J. (1975) Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Incorporated, 
for the year 1974: Minutes of the Annual meeting of the Council of Representatives. American 
Psychologist, 30, 620-651.
2 The American Heritage® Medical Dictionary Copyright © 2007, 2004 by Houghton Mifflin 
Company.
3Due Process clause. This would provide them suspect classification under the law, but the 
process to achieve such status is quite particular.
This article sets forth the analysis required by the courts to deem homosexuals a suspect 
class protected under the constitution, and will hopefully serve to enlighten the legal community 
of the dire need for constitutional reform on the issue of sexual orientation protection from 
discrimination.
II. METHODS OF REVIEW UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
A. RATIONAL-BASIS TEST
The Supreme Court usually applies a minimal method of scrutiny when there’s a 
challenge under the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment of the constitution of a legislative 
classification. This minimally scrutinizing method is called a “rational basis test” which
examines whether the legislature had a justifiable and rational basis related to a legitimate state 
end for enacting a legislation3, and that “statutory classification will be set aside only if no 
grounds can be conceived to justify them”.4 Under this review, whoever challenges the law has 
the impossible burden to prove that the state has absolutely no rational interest in any possible 
                                                       
3 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)
4 McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969)
4good to maintain the law5. The challenged law is virtually always upheld, and the attempts to 
change the long-standing legal system unsurprisingly fail.6
B. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
There are certain cases where the rational review test is not enough to consider the 
complexities of a specific case. These instances are coupled under the “heightened scrutiny” 
consideration, and are those which require a more complex and thorough examination and 
analysis of the law in order to reach a just and unbiased decision. These are cases that either 
discuss “fundamental rights”7 or seemingly and unjustly infringe on the lives of a “suspect” or 
“quasi-suspect”8 group of individuals. Under this category of heightened scrutiny, we find strict 
and intermediate levels of protection:
                                                       
5 57 S. Cal. L. rev. 797 1983-1984, at 808
6  L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1979) § 16-2, at 994-96. Also, Massachusetts Bd. of 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (Marshall J., Dissenting, said that when the rational-basis 
test is applied there is “little doubt about the outcome; the challenged legislation is always upheld”). 
There are a few exceptions to this pattern in history, such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 83 (1971), 
where the Court invalidated laws based on the rational basis test in the early 1970’s. This has been 
explained by the Court’s misunderstanding of rationality with reasonableness, see Bice, Rationality 
Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. REV. 1, 30 (1980). Decisions such as this and the general 
discontent with them are considered the “forbearers” of the intermediate scrutiny tests (Supra note 
5, at 811)
7 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 & n.15 (1982): strict scrutiny for those laws that intrude or 
meddle with fundamental rights. I.e.: See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) for the 
fundamental right of interstate travel.
8 Quasi-suspect groups are those who do not fulfill all the requirements for a suspect classification, 
but are still protected under an intermediate scrutiny level. This term has never been defined by 
the Supreme court themselves, although it was used in the dissent of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 
204 (1982) by Chief Justice Burger (Burger, C.J., Dissenting), and it as also been used by some lower 
courts, I.e.: De Santis v. Pacific Tel & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Circuit 1979).
51. Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is the highest level of protection that Court can give a legislative 
classification. It’s such in which any statue that employs the classification in question must be 
necessary to achieve a permissible and compelling governmental interest, through the least 
restrictive method available, and it must be narrowly tailored.9 . Usually, the standard is so high 
that few legislation survive the scrutiny. The Court deems national origin, race10, religion11, and, 
in some circumstances, alienage12 a suspect class.
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
The first case about a request-to-be suspect group to reach the Supreme Court doubting 
the constitutionality of a law under the Equal Protection Clause was Reed v. Reed in 1971. In 
this case, Sally Reed sued §§ 15-312 and 15-314 of the Idaho Code favoring males as 
administrators in an estate case after someone’s death. (she was denied priority over her husband 
after her son's death). She challenged the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming it 
                                                       
9 Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). 
I.e.: See, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) for the Sherbert Test for a compelling governmental 
interest in Free Exercise of religion cases.
10 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) established the rule that any legislation based on racial 
classification will be subject to the highest standard of review. Also See, Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 
356 (1886).
11 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) . I.e.:  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
12 State laws that discriminate against aliens who are legally in the country are “inherently suspect”, 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), unless the classification falls within a recognized 
"political community" exception, in which case only rational basis scrutiny will be applied.
6infringed on her right to equal protection under the law. In Reed, the Court concluded “By 
providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the 
challenged section violated the Equal Protection Clause.”13 Under Reed, all people similarly 
situated should be given the same treatment and consideration, and gender could not be used to 
discriminate one group over another.
In Craig v. Boren in 1976, the Court took gender to the next step by setting it under 
intermediate scrutiny, a new consideration from the rational basis used in Reed. In Craig v. 
Boren, Curtis Craig challenged the Oklahoma law that applied preference on women to buy 
alcohol at 18, when men couldn't until 21 years of age. The Court decided to apply a new level of 
scrutiny, an intermediate one, in which “To be valid the unequal treatment must serve important 
government objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.”14 Gender was not held as strict as race for discrimination, but it still overpassed the 
rational basis test.
An intermediate level of scrutiny is also applied to those minority groups that fulfill 
some, but not all, the requirements to be considered a suspect class. This intermediate level is 
applied to what we consider quasi-suspect groups. It’s such in which any statue that employs the 
classification in question must achieve an important governmental interest and it must do so in a 
substantially related method to such interest. 15 The only classifications to which the Court has 
                                                       
13 Lee Epstein, Constitutional Law For a Changing America., 6th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2007), p. 665
14 Lee Epstein, Constitutional Law For a Changing America., 6th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2007), p. 620
15 Intermediate scrutiny classification definition: Cornell University Legal Information Institute. 
Retrieved from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny
7applied an intermediate level of scrutiny so far have been gender16, illegitimacy17, and the illegal 
alien status of minors18.
III. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
A suspect class is a group of individuals who undergo special considerations under the 
law to protect them from the political and social majority for their unique background in a 
purposeful, unjustified discrimination past and a history of political powerlessness.19 Because of 
this lack of political power, the minority groups that are subject to a suspect classification are 
more vulnerable to discrimination under the law than would a majority or politically represented 
group if it wasn’t for the heightened attentiveness the Court gives their legislation. Thus, the 
                                                       
16 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) and Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 
724 (1982) for “important governmental interest” as a required component in statues using gender 
classification. For sex classification in education and changes based on the sex of a juror, See J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Also, 
See, Cleburne v. Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) for gender-based classifications under 
heightened scrutiny.
17 Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986) "It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, 
however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within 
the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to 
participate in and contribute to society. The Court recognized in Weber [v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972)] that visiting condemnation upon the child in order to express society's 
disapproval of the parents' liaisons". Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) claimed that the 
illegitimacy classification must be substantially related to the important governmental interest; and 
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) giving heightened scrutiny to legislation affecting 
illegitimate children.
18 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) claimed that those laws that burden children based on their 
illegal status must be subjected to an intermediate scrutiny and provide proof of an important state 
interest. This applies to states and their deprivation of public education from children, but it does 
not consider education a fundamental right at a federal level (San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-39 (1973)).
19 See San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 
8court takes a more meticulous approach to analyzing such statues dealing with suspect 
classifications in order to avoid simply discriminating against an unprotected minority.20
The Supreme Court has never established an exhaustive list of suspect groups, since “It 
cannot be gainsaid that there remain… classes, not now classified as “suspect”, that are unfairly 
burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the individual worth of their members.”21
Making an exhaustive list of classifications would eradicate the possibility of later on finding 
other minorities that might be legally entitled to suspect protection. This is why the Court set 
instead criteria of 4 requirements that any minority group must fulfill at any given time in order 
to be considered a suspect class.
These criteria must be completely matched if the group should be considered for strict 
scrutiny (as race or religion) and only some of them have to be fulfilled in order to be considered 
a quasi-suspect group (as gender). The requirements are: a history of purposeful discrimination, 
an immutable trait, political powerlessness, and the statue must be deemed grossly unfair from a 
reasonable standpoint because of an incorrect stereotyped characteristic. This paper will aim to
prove that homosexuality easily fits the characteristics for a quasi-suspect protection, but it is the 
belief of the author that a case can be perfectly made for full strict scrutiny of the minority 
group.22
                                                       
20 Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4
21 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (Marshall J., dissenting)
22 In the recent past, the Supreme Court has been more adamant to allow strict scrutiny status than 
intermediate scrutiny to those groups that defy constitutional statues. This conservative standpoint 
that the chief justices have taken makes it that much more complicated for minorities like 
homosexuals to fight for strict scrutiny, leaving the fate of this analysis on immutability, which 
seems to be the most debatable and fickle aspect of this discourse. Given the highly unclear and 
obscure outcome of the judge’s recognition of homosexual immutability, the aim of this paper is to 
provide sufficient evidence of scientific research for their approval whilst still requiring a minimum 
of quasi-suspect status.
91. Immutable Trait23 That The Members Of The Group Cannot Earn Or Choose To Opt Out Of
The Court has specified in previous cases that factors that are beyond the control of the 
individual and are permanent or invariable within group membership can and should be taken 
into consideration when deciding cases in favor or against the suspectness of a group24. These 
considerations are crucial to maintaining “fairness and adequacy of representation”25 within the 
judicial system. Individuals need to show adequacy to the level of relationship they maintain 
with the group they claim to be part of. And fairness with the extent of their responsibilities and 
wrongdoings, and the degree to which both relate to their legal burdens. 
Immutability and lack of control have been taken into consideration for quasi-suspect 
groups such as gender and child alienage. For example, the Court stated in Frontiero v. 
Richardson that “sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined 
solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a 
particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that 
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.”26 The court also 
claimed it was unjust to punish an illegitimate child based on the illegitimacy because he or she 
was not responsible for it (it was out of their control).27
                                                       
23 For reference on all the following requirements/criteria of suspectness, See Id. note 5, at 812-915
24 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 204 (1982); Mathews v. 
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
25 Id. note 5, at 813
26 Lee Epstein, Constitutional Law For a Changing America., 6th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2007), p. 667
27 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979); See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 427 U. S. 505
(1976): “is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary 
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual 
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth, and penalizing the 
illegitimate child is an ineffectual -- as well as an unjust -- way of deterring the parent."
10
Immutability is neither sufficient nor necessary to claim a group suspect or quasi-suspect. 
The Court determines which groups pass the relevant threshold on an individual basis for every 
single case they review. Furthermore, groups such as gender or race are not as unchangeable as 
they once used to be, since nowadays they can be altered even if at a great expense to the 
individual.
2. Incorrect Stereotypes
This criterion helps the Court stop discrimination or injustices on the basis of a 
prejudicial characteristic of a group that is not true or has stopped being true. The aim is to 
prevent the unfair disadvantage of a group based on mistaken stereotypes.28
The Court believes individuals should not be simple categorized on the basis of prejudice 
for group membership, but also considered by their abilities as individuals even if stereotypes 
may indicate otherwise. For example, in Frontiero the court showed their opposition to the 
practice of legally generalizing a social opinion, stating “Statutory distinctions between the sexes 
often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status 
without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members”.29
This requirement is also neither conclusive nor necessary. It only provides a “general 
guidance”30, given that all legislations utilize stereotypes in one form or other in their decisions.
                                                       
28I.e.: See  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
29 Lee Epstein, Constitutional Law For a Changing America., 6th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2007), p. 667, quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
30 Id. note 5, at 814
11
3. History Of Purposeful And Unequal Treatment
History of discrimination tries to prove that the group in question has been subjected to a 
past of prejudicial and unequal treatment in society (either socially, politically, judicially, or all 
of the above together). In gender-based classification cases like Frontier v. Richardson, the court 
considered the long history of sex-discrimination experienced in the United States to be 
significant evidence for an “increased sensitivity to sex-based classifications”31. 
But this criterion has also been used to refute certain claims of suspect classification in 
groups like the elderly. The Court denied the elderly to be a suspect group, arguing, “While the 
treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination, [the elderly]… 
have not experienced a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’”32. Thus, while the criterion 
can be used to claim suspectness, the lack of thereof can also be a factor in their dismissal. 
There’s a thin line between a history of discrimination that’s unfair and one that is justified by 
the legal system, such as unequal treatment of the basis of criminal behavior33 or one that isn’t 
significant enough to be considered purposeful, as they may be considered simple preferences or 
principled disapproval.
                                                       
31 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
32 64 Temp. L. R. 947 1991, quoting the majority decision in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
33 John Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard Paperbacks) (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), at 260 n.64.
12
4. Political Powerlessness
The lack of a political influence is one of the most important factors when deciding 
which groups should be afforded special protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. “Discrete 
and insular minorities”34 is how the Court addressed those groups of individuals which lack 
sufficient political influence in order to make a significant difference in the decision-making
process. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the group has to be numerically a minority. For 
example, women constitute a numerical majority of the population but are still considered a 
political minority in the United States because of their low political impact and political 
representation as a whole.35 The group has to have been “relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”36. 
The Court seeks to protect these minorities with heightened scrutiny in legislation because the 
assumption concludes they would be defenseless to the oppressive majority through the other 
branches of government. Groups that face political powerlessness are justified in requiring 
special protection, and those whose are not politically powerless can reasonably be restricted by 
this criterion. 
                                                       
34 In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the Court addressed aliens as a prime 
example of a “discrete and insular minority”.
35 Janine A. Parry ,“Women's policy agencies, the women's movement and representation in the 
USA” in Joni Lovenduski, ed., State Feminism and Political Representation (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 239-259
36 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
13
IV. THE PARTICULAR CASE FOR HOMOSEXUALITY
(CRITERIA APPLIED)
A. IMMUTABILITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
As we previously pointed out, sexual orientation is one of the most polemical and 
controversial aspects of this research. The question as to whether homosexuals are born gay or 
their sexual orientation is a product of their environment is one that has been intensely debated 
by both proponents and opposing scholars. It all boils down to deciding whether it’s a permanent 
characteristic in the individual that he or she has absolutely no control over, or it’s a product of 
our upbringing and can be “cured” or changed.  
Even if it’s the decision of the court to consider homosexuality as part of the former 
category, it still is bound to prove a fallacy in at least another category. Certain suspect groups 
such as gender and race are not completely immutable, but it would be preposterous to claim 
they do not deserve constitutional protection as minorities. Even if a black man can “pass” for 
white because of his lighter pigmentation and a man can get a sex-change operation to become 
biologically a woman37, it does not nullify their suspectness in the eyes of the law. Subsequently, 
even if homosexuality is not considered an immutable trait, it should be proven that it does not 
qualify in other criteria to be suspect. As explained earlier in this paper, the immutability of 
                                                       
37 For the purpose of this paper, I address a biological woman as such who is identified as female 
through female genitalia and a legal female status (which can be switched from male to female 
under the law after a sex operation). I do require females to be able to reproduce or have 
functioning reproduction systems in order to be considered a “woman”, as nobody else should, for 
women who are born female and are not able to reproduce offspring are still viewed as female 
under the law.
14
characteristics is not necessary not sufficient for suspectness. This does not imply that such 
suspect groups should from now on be no longer considered suspect, but that instead 
homosexuals be considered suspect as well. If the Court dismisses their suspect classification 
merely on the basis of immutability, then it would have to explain to society why the judicial 
system seems to be biased for certain groups and unequally give lesser consideration to others 
under the same logical and procedural analysis.
The nature versus nurture dilemma is one riddled with scientific research, and it’s the aim 
of this section to provide sufficient evidence as to the immutable and innate aspects of 
homosexuality, thus fulfilling the criteria herein discussed.
1. Levay And Differences In The Hypothalamus
Simon LeVay conducted his research in the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in San 
Diego, where he reported “subtle but significant differences” in between the composition of the 
hypothalamus of homosexual and heterosexual men38 close in age. LeVay dissected the brains of
forty-one subjects, nineteen homosexual men, six heterosexual women, and sixteen heterosexual 
men, and compared a particular cluster of cells called the INAH-3 on the anterior 
hypothalamus39, which is the section of the brain associated with a heterosexual male’s sexual 
behavior40. He discovered that, alike the comparison between men and women’s INAH-341, all
                                                       
38 14 Regent U. L. Rev. 383, 515 (2001-2002)
39 Id. Note 38
40 LeVay, “A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure between Heterosexual and Homosexual men.”, 
Science, New Series, Vol. 253, No. 5023 (Aug. 30, 1991), pp. 1036. Citing A. A. Perachio, L. D. Marr, 
M. Alexander, Brain Res. 177, 127 (1979); Y. Oomura, H. Yoshimatsu, S. Aou, ibid. 266, 340 (1983).
15
homosexual men also showed a much smaller level of these clusters of cells than any of the 
heterosexuals men did. 
While the levels of INAH 1, 2, and 4, showed no difference, the levels of INAH-3 on 
heterosexual males were more than double that of homosexual males or females42. As LeVay
himself puts it, “This finding indicates that INAH is dimorphic with sexual orientation, at least in 
men, and suggests that sexual orientation has a biological substrate.”43
The theory LeVay concluded was that all individuals who were attracted to males had a 
smaller cluster of INAH-3 in their hypothalamus than did those individuals attracted to women. 
Biologically, then, homosexual men who are sexually oriented towards other men show a 
particular scientific difference in their anterior hypothalamus than heterosexual ones, thus 
proving a characteristic of sexual orientation that is beyond the control of the individual, and so 
far as we’re aware, immutable. 
Even considering that only some of the heterosexual men but all of the homosexual ones 
died of AIDS, the research found no correlation between their cause of death and the results in 
the study:
                                                                                                                                                                                  
41 William Byne, Science and Belief: Psychobiological Research on Sexual Orientation; 28 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 303, 327 (1995)
42 Supra note 40, at 1035 (“One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to look for significant 
differences between subject groups (Fig. 2). No differences were found for INAH 1, 2, or 4. […] INAH 
3 did exhibit dimorphism. One-way ANOVA showed that the three sample groups (from women, 
heterosexual men, and homosexual men) were unlikely to have come from the same population (P 
= 0.0014). Consistent with the hypothesis outlined above, the volume of this nucleus was more than 
twice as large in the heterosexual men (0.12 +- 0.01 mm3, mean +- SEM) as in the homosexual men 
(0.051 +- 0.01 mm3). Because of uncertainty about the nature of the underlying distribution, the 
significance of this difference was evaluated by a Monte Carlo procedure (11); this showed the 
difference to be highly significant (P = 0.001). The difference was still significant when the 
homosexual men were compared with only the six heterosexual men who died of complications of 
AIDS (P = 0.028). There was a similar difference between the heterosexual men and the women 
(mean 0.056 +- 0.02 mm3; P = 0.019), replicating the observations in (6).”)
43LeVay, supra
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“There was no significant difference in the volume of INAH 3 between the heterosexual 
men who died of AIDS and those who died of other causes or between the homosexual 
men and the women. These data support the hypothesis that INAH 3 is dimorphic not 
with sex but with sexual orientation, at least in men.”44
2. Twin Studies And Concordant Genetic Makeup
Before we dive head-first into the studies about twins, it would be worthy to note the 
difference between identical and fraternal twins that is relevant to these studies. Identical twins 
share the exact same (100%) genetic material. They are called monozygotic twins because they 
“develop from a single fertilized egg”45, which later divides and creates two separate individuals 
with identical genetic makeup. Fraternal twins, on the other hand, are developed from two 
separate eggs, which is why they’re called dizygotic twins. Their genetic material is just as 
similar as would those of a brother and sister be, since they are basically only siblings that share 
their mother’s womb for development of the fetuses simultaneously. 
This would mean that genetic characteristics are more prone to be observed shared by 
monozygotic twins than dizygotic twins given their identical genetic material.46
                                                       
44 LeVay, supra
45 Francis Mark Mondimore, A Natural History of Homosexuality (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996) p. 137
46 Mondimore, supra  at 138
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2.1. Kallmann’s Early Findings
The first twin study was done by Dr. Frank Kallmann and was published in the British 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease in 1952. This study was conducted as a response to a 
previous study on homosexuality, by disproving the previous belief that gay men had a defective 
Y chromosome in their genes and so have a larger number of sisters than brothers.47 Kallmann 
surveyed eighty-five homosexual men (of which sixty-one twins were also surveyed for cross-
comparison), and discovered that while only 11.5 percent of fraternal twins had a concordance of 
homosexual identity, identical twins shared a shocking almost 100% of concordance rate with 
each other. This highly controversial number “weakens the significance of explanations which 
over-stress… factors such as parental incompetence in the etiology of adult homosexuality.”48
There were a few problems with Kallmann’s study that lost credibility for his research. 
He selected the subjects from mental institutions, which is not a very reliable source for unbiased 
and untampered research, and he did not actually corroborate which sets of twins were 
monozygotic and which were dizygotic49. Scholars quickly dismissed his research, and it wasn’t 
until the 1990’s that another large-scale twin study took place: the Bailey and Pillard’s study.
                                                       
47Mondimore, supra at 138 (“The theory was that most males with a defective Y chromosome 
should die in utero.”)
48 Mondimore, supra at 138 Quoting Kallman, “Comparative Twin Study” at p. 297.
49Mondimore, supra at 138. 
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2.2. Bailey And Pillard’s Conclusive Research On Twins
Michael Bailey of Northwestern University and Richard Pillar of the Boston School of 
Medicine were the next scholars to study the concordance of genetic material in twins. In 1991, 
they conducted a research with more than one hundred pair of male twins, and in 1993 a second 
study was released involving female twins. The researchers sought homosexual males and 
females who either had an identical twin, a fraternal twin, or an adoptive sibling, and later 
compared the results from each group. 
As expected, there was a higher correlation between identical twins than with fraternal 
twins, and they both had a higher correlation than adoptive siblings (who share absolutely no 
genetic material, and thus should have little to no correlation). Identical male twins had a 
concordance of 50% (which means that half of all monozygotic homosexual twin males have a 
homosexual brother), and female identical twins had a concordance of 48%. Fraternal twins, on 
the other hand, had a concordance of 24% in males and 16% in females. Lastly, adoptive siblings 
had the smaller concordance: adoptive brothers had a concordance of 19% and adoptive sisters of 
merely 6%. 
The following graph depicts the findings:
As we can clearly observe, the concordance of homosexuality is on a clear downward 
slope from closest genetic makeup being the highest correlation to complete lack of genetic 
resemblance being the lowest. This definitively proves what Kallmann tried to sho
without much avail: that homosexuality is part, in one way or another, of our genetic makeup and 
thus we are predisposed from birth to our sexual orientation. This would seem to put an end to 
the dilemma of immutability, or at least it would a
of control homosexuals have on their predisposed sexual orientation.
There has been criticism on the results of the test, although not very significant. Some 
believe that it is strange that the levels between 
rather similar50. After all, if the correlation is valid then one would expect two individuals who 
share no genetic material at all to have a much lesser concordance of homosexuality than those 
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individuals who were genetically related as siblings. But this is not a big concern in the study as 
a whole. The researchers believe that the slightly high concordance numbers between adoptive 
brothers is due to the fact that homosexuals who had non-gay adoptive brothers were much more 
reluctant to let them be interviewed than those who didn’t51. If most of the adoptive brothers data 
was collected by those who were more willing and prone to let their brothers be interviewed, and 
such volunteers were observed to be more often than not willing when their brothers were also 
gay, then it is clear how the result could be, even if slightly, skewed towards a higher 
concordance of homosexual characteristics in this group.
A perfect example of the downward slope can be seen on the female study, and we can 
assume such as confidently that the same strong correlation is happening in males. Moreover, 
plenty of other studies have been made on twins to corroborate these findings, all successful and 
more specific in their procedures to avoid any mistakes or biases made before, and with the same 
results determining sexual orientation being “substantially influenced by hereditary factors in 
both males and females.”52
3. The X-Chromosome Study
What seems to be one of the most scientifically sound and empirically proven research on 
homosexual genetics was conducted in 1993 by Dean H. Hamer and a group of geneticists at the 
                                                       
51 Mondimore, supra at 140
52 Mondimore, supra At p.141 Quoting for example J. Michael Bailey and Deana S. Benishay, 
“Familial Aggregation of Female Sexual Orientation”, American Journal of Psychiatry 150 (1993): 
272-77; and Frederick Whitman, Milton Diamond, and James Martin, “Homosexual Orientation in 
Twins: A report on Sixty-One Pairs and Three Triplet Sets”, Archives of sexual Behavior 22, no. 3 
(1993): 187-206. See also Constance Holden, ed., “Random Samples”, Science 268 (June 16, 1995): 
1571.
21
National Institutes of Health. This research was published under the name “A Linkage between 
DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation” and it set out to finally 
determine once and for all if there was strict relationship between a subject’s genetic 
composition and their sexual orientation. In laymen’s terms, their goal was to prove that 
homosexuality is genetically caused, and thus as immutable and out of the subject’s control as 
would be their race or gender.
Hamer interviewed over one hundred families and asked the homosexual members of 
such families to identify themselves and their family members as either homosexual or 
heterosexual based on the Kinsley scale53. After they all completed the self-assessments and their 
family assessments were verified54, Hamer and his team noticed a pattern between the genealogy 
of the families and the sexual orientation of the members. Out of the 76 homosexual subjects, the 
highest rate of sexual orientation concordance was with their brothers, whom shared a 13.5% 
chance of also being gay55. The next closest group of concordance were maternal uncles and 
maternal cousins, who shared an astonishing ~7.5% chance of also being a homosexual56. There 
were no significant female homosexual concordances in any members, or concordance with their 
fathers. This unmistakable, specific, and obvious pattern was enough to spark curiosity in 
Hamer’s team. 
Given that the highest concordance rates were found through either brothers or family 
members on the maternal side, the team hypothesized that whatever genetic concordance of 
                                                       
53 Dean H. Hamer, et al., “A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual 
Orientation” Science, New Series, Vol. 261, No. 5119 (Jul. 16, 1993), p. 321(“Sexual orientation was 
assessed by the Kinsey scales, which range from 0 for exclusive heterosexuality to 6 for exclusive 
homosexuality (13). Subjects rated them-selves on four aspects of their sexuality: self-
identification, attraction, fantasy, and behavior”)
54 Hamer, supra at 322 (“The reliability of the probands' assessment of their family members' 
sexual orientation was estimated by conducting interviews with 99 relatives of the index subjects.”)
55 Hamer, supra at 322
56 Hamer, supra at 322
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sexual orientation had to come from the subject’s maternal genetic line. Thus, those families with 
homosexual brothers should show a higher concordance rate with their maternal uncles and 
cousins. The following study was conducted with 38 families that had a set of homosexual 
brothers and no father-to-son homosexual match57. The new sub-group of subjects and their 
families were then interviewed, and as expected they yielded even higher percentages. The study 
showed a 10.3% of concordance with their maternal uncles (from the original 7.3%) and 12.9% 
(from 7.7%) with their maternal cousins58.  
This could not be explained by environmental factors, given that the family members 
were raised in different households and even in different generations. Thus, the research team 
now had a clear understanding that there was indeed a specific genetic component of 
homosexuality, and since it was though the maternal line then it most likely was rooted in at least 
a section the X-chromosome (the chromosome we get from our mothers). As Hamer explained 
“Since males receive their single X chromosome from their mothers, any trait that is influenced 
by an X-linked gene will be preferentially passed through the mother’s side of the family.”59
A linkage test for the X chromosome of the subjects was a foolproof study to rule out any 
other possible causes of the pattern. The results were translucent and definite. Out of the 40 sub-
pairs of families selected (the original 38 and 2 randomly selected), 33 shared a concordance in 
markers in the area of Xq28 (the tip of the long arm of the X-chromosome)60. Statistically, the 
confidence level of this study is of over 99%, which means there’s less than a 1% chance of it 
being a random coincidence. Hamer finally concluded that the Xq28 is a clear genetic cause of, 
or at least a really strong contribution to, sexual orientation in homosexual men.
                                                       
57 Hamer, supra at 322 (None of the subject’s father or their son/s were homosexual)
58 Hamer, supra at 322 (By maternal cousins, we mean narrowly those sons of maternal aunts, in 
order to maintain the maternal gene line).
59 Hamer, supra At 323
60 Hamer, supra At 324
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B. A HISTORY OF PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION
As the Connecticut Supreme Court well explained, “The bigotry and hatred that gay 
persons have faced are akin to, and, in certain respects, perhaps even more severe than, those 
confronted by some [other] groups that have been accorded heightened judicial protection.” 61
Homosexuals as a group have been the targets of discrimination for hundreds of years, 
both by the private and public sectors. Society by itself has been cruel and unforgiving towards 
homosexuals, lead by widespread misconceptions and deceiving authority figures, but the 
argument in this particular section of suspect class analysis focuses on such discrimination 
abided by the government itself in its judicial, legislative, and executive branches. 
Such discrimination is blatant and grossly unfair, and by the end of this section we expect 
to leave the reader without any possible doubt that history is riddled with countless examples of 
dubious discrimination merely on the basis of an individual’s sexual orientation. By no means 
this list is all-inclusive, but it should provide sufficient examples to appease any inquiring mind. 
1. Anti-Sodomy Laws
Anti-sodomy laws were in effect in every state of the United States until 1961, imposing 
numerous punishments and penalties on any individual, either female or male, who engaged in 
sodomy (behavior most commonly known as anal and oral sexual intercourse). For example, the 
Georgia anti-sodomy law challenged in Bowers v. Hardwick stated as follows:
                                                       
61 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 446  (Conn. 2008).
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“(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any 
sexual act involving the sex organ of one person and the mouth or anus of another…. 
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for 
not less than one nor more than 20 years.”62
Illinois was the first state to break the trend in 61’ by eliminating private consensual 
sodomy between two adults as a punishable offense63. Before this, “the states between 1946 and 
1961 imposed criminal punishments on as many as a one million lesbians and gay men engaged 
in consensual adult intercourse, dancing, kissing, or holding hands.”64 Pennsylvania was the first 
to enact an anti-sodomy law in 187965 and by the 1920’s all other states had follow suit.
Even if not all anti-sodomy laws specifically targeted homosexuals, the repercussions 
were mostly felt by them. Anal and oral sex are the only or main forms of sexual behavior gay 
men and lesbians can participate in, thus banning such behavior affects gay men personally and 
most lesbians particularly, which in turn aims to target them. 
These laws were challenged and upheld even as late as in 1993, most famously decided 
by the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, where a man was caught having consensual 
homosexual relations with another man in his home. The Court claimed in Bowers that even if 
American citizens had an implicit right to privacy in the constitution, this right did not extend to 
protect homosexual sexual acts. Chief Justice Burger’s concurrent opinion declared, “There is no 
such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy” and to “hold that homosexual 
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral 
                                                       
62 Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984)
63 Lee Walzer, Gay Rights On Trial: a Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2002), p. 
68
64 William N. Eskridge and Jr, Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 60
65 Eskridge, supra At 24
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teaching.”66 Anti-sodomy laws were up to each individual state to impose or exclude from their 
state constitutions, until Lawrence v. Texas in 2003. The Supreme Court heard the case of John 
Geddes Lawrence, a man who was arrested for having anal sex with another consenting male, 
Tyron Garner, and charged for breaking Chapter 21, Section 21.06 of the Texas Penal Code 
(most commonly known as the “homosexual conduct law”) banning sodomy acts. The Court 
decided on a 6-3 ruling that Bowers was unconstitutional, and set precedent to ban any present or 
future anti-sodomy laws (which invalidated laws in the last 13 states with illegal sodomy). 
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion declared that there is a fundamental right for consenting 
adults to engage in private sexual activity, and he specified that this right is protected under the 
word "liberty" in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Kennedy wrote: "The Court began its substantive discussion in Bowers as 
follows: 'The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that 
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.' That statement, we now 
conclude, discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say 
that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the 
claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said 
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse."67
The Court finally ruled in favor of homosexual’s privacy, but this way incredibly late in 
history compared to similar cases. Interracial couples once were banned from sexual activity 
with one another68, but in 1964, much earlier than Lawrence, the Court ruled them 
                                                       
66 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
67 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Justice Kennedy delivering the court’s opinion.
68 Section 798.05 of Florida statutes read: “Any negro man and white woman, or any white man and 
negro woman, who are not married to each other, who shall habitually live in and occupy in the 
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unconstitutional under the Fourteenth amendment69. Moreover, anti-sodomy laws yielded many 
other legal reprimands for homosexuals. For example, gay solicitation was a crime in all states 
because it encouraged others to participate in a criminal act (sodomy), and thus was illegal70. 
This is how most homosexuals were caught, since unveiling the occurrence of sodomy acts in 
someone’s private home was rather difficult but catching him soliciting it in public wasn’t71.
2. Marriage Inequality
The Hawaii Supreme Court decided in Baehr v. Miike72 (1993) that denying marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples under Hawaii’s law HRS 572-1 constituted as a form of 
discrimination against the class and thus was unconstitutional73. The Court claimed that denying 
a marriage license for Ninia Baehr and Genora Dancel was a form of sex-discrimination and did 
not carry a compelling state interest for it to pass the scrutiny threshold. “Further, even assuming 
arguendo that Defendant was able to demonstrate that the sex-based classification of HRS 572-1 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
nighttime the same room shall each be punished by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or 
by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.”
69 McLaughlin v. Florida 379 U.S. 184 (1964)
70 edited et al., Homosexuality: Discrimination, Criminology, and the Law (New York: Articles-Garlan, 
1992), p. 404
71 Supra note 70, At 405 citing Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 252 n.8, 599 P.2d 636, 644 
n.8, 158 Cal Report 330, 338 n.8 (1979)
72 Formerly Baehr v. Lewin
73 See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993) Judge Chang stated the opinion of the court: 
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT: 1. The sex-based classification in HRS 
572-1, on its face and as applied, is unconstitutional and in violation of the equal protection clause 
of article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution. 2. Defendant Lawrence H. Miike, as Director of 
Department of Health, State of Hawaii, and his agents, and any person in acting in concert with 
Defendant or claiming by or through him, is enjoined from denying an application for a marriage 
license solely because the applicants are of the same sex. 3. To the extent permitted by law, costs 
shall be imposed against Defendant and awarded in favor of Plaintiffs. “
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is justified because it furthers a compelling state interest, Defendant has failed to establish that 
HRS 572-1 is narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.”74
After Hawaii’s Supreme Court decision, Congress adopted The Defense of Marriage Act 
as a response to a wave of state legislatures banning same-sex marriage. DOMA is the most 
controversial congressional law passed against homosexuals in the United States in the past 20 
years. Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, which bars federal 
recognition of same-sex marriages and allows states to follow suit legally. It denies 1,138 federal 
statues involving marriage or spousehood to be extended to same-sex couples75. Since 
1996, many states have enacted legislation prohibiting same-sex marriages or the recognition of 
same-sex marriages formed in another jurisdiction. States have traditionally recognized 
marriages granted in other states, even such states which have laws that do not allow same-sex 
marriages to be solemnized.76
The pursuit of marriage equality for same-sex couples brings much-needed focus to the 
everyday needs of lesbian and gay couples. Without full legal recognition and protections, same-
sex couples confront a variety of complicated legal and financial issues.
Currently, the federal government does not respect the actual legal status of married 
same-sex couples and individuals who have been married to a same-sex spouse for any purpose, 
including federal income taxation and estate and gift tax considerations, regardless of whether 
their home states honor their unions. Same-sex married couples thus are required to file separate 
individual federal income tax returns, each with a filing status of "single," even when they must 
                                                       
74 In Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993) under Conclusion of Law by Judge Chang.
75 Elizabeth Burleson, From Nondiscrimination to Civil Marriage, 19 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 383 
(2010). P. 391
76 16 Quinnipiac Law Rev. 192 (1996-1997) (“Accordingly, it enacted the so-called Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), which permits states to refuse recognition to ‘any public act, record, or 
judicial proceeding of any other State ... respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex 
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State…’”)
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file their state returns with a "married" status. Because taxpayers can face legal liability if they 
knowingly file a tax return that is false or misleading and the federal tax return form presently 
offers no way for same-sex married couples to identify their legal status accurately, some worry 
that they could risk a penalty no matter how they prepare their federal return.
Moreover, there are countless of benefits and rights that homosexuals are being deprived 
of by this federal ban on same-sex marriages. As the Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders
(GLAD) so readily explain:
Federal law excludes legally married same-sex couples and their children from the 
biggest programs our government offers to support and protect families and denies 
them important federal rights and protections, including:
 The right to take time off from work to care for a seriously ill spouse through the 
Family
Medical Leave Act; Access to all the benefits of a spouse’s health plan, without a tax 
penalty;
 Medicaid preventions against elder homelessness when one spouse goes into a
nursing home;
 Social Security spousal and survivor benefits related to disability, care of a minor 
child, retirement, and death, which protect a family’s economic security in old age, and 
upon disability or death
 The right to leave assets to your spouse – including the home you share together –
without incurring a tax penalty;
 Joint tax filing and pooled deductions that can save families money;
 Retirement and death benefits for spouses of federal employees;
 Disability, dependency or death benefits for the spouses of veterans and public safety 
officers;
 The ability to sponsor a non-resident spouse for purposes of immigration.77
The language of DOMA is by itself discriminatory towards homosexuals. Title one 
describes marriage as between a man and a woman only for all federal purposes, which 
automatically excludes same-sex couples from engaging in the practice of marriage. There is no 
question that DOMA discriminates against homosexuals, and just as anti-sodomy laws it should 
                                                       
77 “DOMA”: Federal Discrimination Against Same-Sex Married Couples” flyer (See: 
www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/doma-flyer.pdf)
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be unconstitutional. As McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) established the legality of interracial 
sexual relations, Loving v. Virginia (1967) followed by allowing interracial marriages. Why 
hasn’t the court allowed same-sex marriages federally after Lawrence v. Texas as well? That’s a 
question that remains unanswered. If anti-miscegenation laws are unconstitutional for 
discriminating against the class of race by prohibiting them the right of marriage, it should 
logically follow that homosexuals should not be discriminated as a class either with laws such as 
DOMA.
3. Immigration Policies
Immigration laws once targeted all foreign homosexuals and banned them from United 
States territory. Homosexuals were first banned from entering the United States in the 
Immigration Act of 1917, which synthesized all exclusions for entry into the country and added a 
new group of individuals who were banned: those suffering from “constitutional psychopathic 
inferiority”78. This latter group referred to sexual degenerates, of which homosexuals were 
considered part. Those in charge of enforcing this law considered this group to contain 
individuals such as sexual perverts and other who “because of eccentric behavior, defective
judgment, or abnormal impulses are in repeated conflict with social customs and constituted 
authorities”79. 
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Under the “crimes of moral turpitude” exclusion, alien homosexuals could be deported 
for simply admitting to conducts such as sodomy, public lewdness, or gross indecency80. In other 
words, if anyone admitted to being a homosexual, or even participating in homosexual sexual 
behavior, he or she would be deported or denied entry to the United States of America. 
Physicians examined all aliens who gave indicia of homosexuality and those who were 
certified as “mentally defective” were denied admission to the states. Homosexuals were 
classified back then as psychopathic inferior or mental defectives by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services (INS) and the Public Health Service (PHS)81. The aim of this clause was 
to prevent any mental defects that might corrupt the minds of other American citizens or have a 
possibility of being passed down through generations and multiply82. Laws that banned lesbian 
and gay immigrants were officially repealed in 1990, but homosexual immigrants are still 
burdened with plenty of obstacle when filing for a legal alien status. For example, current 
immigration policy only recognizes “direct family ties” if they are heterosexual, thus same sex
partners are therefore denied such immigration privileges when one of them is a citizen and the 
other seeks naturalization.
This idea that homosexuals were mentally defective was common both socially and in the 
medical field back then. Discrimination does not get clearer than when a group of individuals is 
stigmatized and then banned from even sharing the same physical space with other human 
beings. The mere fact that it took until 1990 for the government to realize how immoral and cruel 
these laws were, and that it still holds on to certain prejudices, is simply appalling.
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4. Gays In The Military
The U.S. military has had rules and laws against homosexual activity on duty for 
centuries. The ban on homosexual behavior was created de jure83 in 1943 when military 
regulations first established guidelines for military psychiatrists and their analysis of 
homosexuals84. The doctors were to select homosexuals as those individuals who “habitually or 
occasionally engaged in homosexual or other perverse sexual practices”, claiming they were 
“unsuitable for military service”85. This officially created the ban of homosexuals from ever 
participating as part of the armed forces of the United States86.
The military has almost always dealt with complaints and law suits internally, and their 
homosexual ban was no different. The practice was not challenged until 1993, when President 
Bill Clinton sought to change the prosecution of homosexuals in the military and steer the 
regulations towards a ban on homosexual behavior rather than homosexual status of an 
individual87.
The President and Congress together passed the law most commonly known as “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT), which was announced on July 19, 1993. The policy then set in place 
prohibited military officials from questioning or investigating the sexual preference of a military 
applicant without any previous compelling evidence for suspicion. The military still held the 
                                                       
83 Before this, the ban existed de facto. There have been cases against homosexuals in the military 
which led to their discharge as early as in 1778. See, 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 920 1993-1994
84 Id. Note 83
85 Id. Note 83 quoting “Randy Shilts, conduct unbecoming: lesbians and gays in the U.S. military,
Vietnam to the Persian Gulf 11 (1993).”
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right to discharge members who “engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to 
engage in a homosexual act or acts."88
In 2010, Congress passed the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 201089, which 
invalidated DADT and discontinued its implementation effective September 20th, 2011. The act 
did not invalidate Don’t Ask Don’t Tell on the basis it discriminated against homosexuals, but 
instead simply called for its elimination seeking to “assure appropriate ways to monitor the 
workforce climate and military effectiveness that support successful follow-through on 
implementation.”90 This not only leaves an opportunity open for future military bans on 
homosexual behavior, but it undermines the motives behind changing the legislation in the first 
place, most importantly seeking equality for all American citizens and stop discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.
5. Employment And Housing Discrimination
Employment and housing are two factors that affect an individual the most. How one 
makes an income to subsist or support one’s family is a crucial aspect of an individual’s life. 
Where one lives, raises one’s children, or even gets to call a “home”, is just as important. When 
there is no uniform federal law that prevents employers and landlords from discriminating 
against sexual orientation, intricate aspects of a person’s lives are at risk and thus it generates a 
cycle of unfair treatment towards the class.
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In 1884, Payne v. Western Alt. R. R. set precedent for the doctrine of “employment at 
will”. This allowed private and public employers to fire any employees for any basis without 
being subject to providing justification91. Some improvement has been taken in this area, 
including laws that protect gender bias, but nothing has been done at a large scale to protect 
homosexuals and their partners. There are currently no federal laws that protect homosexuals 
from being discriminated against in the private employment sphere. Unless a state or municipal 
law prevents it, employers can fire or refuse to hire individuals merely on the basis of their 
sexual orientation.
Although some states have passed anti-discrimination laws, these are not necessarily 
effective. In California, for example, The Department of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) 
received 372 cases claiming discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 199692. Out of all 
these cases, 40% were dismissed, 27% were abandoned, 24% were withdrawn, and 9% were 
settled in favor of the complainant93. The state did not investigate why 91% of their cases did not 
reach a successful resolution, but the outcome isn’t so surprising when the state employs one
individual alone to handle every single case of labor law complaints throughout the entire state94.
In Schools, a governmental employer, cases have been no different. Different Boards of 
Education also feared that teacher’s homosexuality would corrupt the youth and thus had the 
ability to fire them. In Ancofara v. Board of Education (1974), the Court ruled that the Board of 
Education of Montgomery County had the right to fire a teacher simply because he was a 
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homosexual and had tried to conceal it95. Claiming, “his intentional withholding of facts about 
his affiliation with the Homophiles is inextricably linked to his attack on the constitutionality of 
the school system's refusal to employ homosexuals as teachers.96” In Gaylord v. Tacoma School 
District n. 10 (1977), the Court also set precedent denying Mr. Gaylord’s job back after being 
fired for being a homosexual on the basis that his sexual orientation was implicitly immoral and 
obtrusive to his efficient teaching on morality97.
5.2. Housing
Just as the issue of employment, there is no federal law that protects homosexuals from 
being discriminated against on the aspect of housing. Individuals can be denied housing (either 
for rent or buy) on the basis of their sexual orientation. Some cities have laws that protect 
homosexuals from this kind of discrimination, but they’re not as widespread as they should.
For example, in 2000 the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Thomas v. 
Anchorage that a landlord had the right to deny housing to an individual on the basis of their 
sexual orientation98. The court concluded that laws preventing them to do so would 
unconstitutionally get in the way between a person’s religion and their business99.
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C. INCORRECT STEREOTYPES
Stereotypes are created to categorize a group of people under a single, often narrow-
minded conception of traits, looks, and behaviors. As human beings, we categorize objects and 
actions in all aspects of life as a form of time management and life organization. But when we 
apply these categories to human being, it often results in stereotypes100. Stereotypes occur when 
we group individuals into one category based on common traits, then add additional traits into 
that category (often after observing a single member with those additional traits, but sometimes 
simply on the basis of prejudice or stipulation), and lastly, inferring that all members of such 
category thus exhibit the newly added traits. These inferences are often unfounded and too broad 
to be applied to each member despite their personal characteristics.
Homosexuals have been subjected to incorrect stereotypes for hundreds of years, and it 
wasn’t until recent social movements and medical discoveries that these stereotypes began 
falling apart. The subjection of homosexuals to mistaken stereotypes is closely related to the 
previous section, a history of discrimination. Legal actions that discriminated against 
homosexuals gave rise to incorrect stereotypes, and vice versa, stereotypes fueled political 
arguments into implementing anti-homosexual laws. 
This section will try to briefly explain some of the common misconceptions about 
homosexuals in the United States in the recent past, and how they justified different policies and 
laws discriminating against gays and lesbians. Needless to say, the following stereotypes are 
absolutely unfounded and inaccurate. Most of them have been turned around or ceased to have 
                                                       
100 Herek, Gregory M., “Stigma, Prejudice, and Violence Against Lesbians and gay Men.” In Eds. 
(1991) Homosexuality: Research Implications for public policy. Page 65.
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widespread belief, but there are still plenty of homosexual stereotypes that remain alive within 
our society.
1. Homosexuals And The American Children
1.1 Gays Will Turn Your Kids Gay
There is no more ridiculous stereotype as that of homosexuals’ ability to “turn” children 
gay. There was once, and still somewhat is, a societal view that homosexuals can and will 
actually make children gay if they come in contact with them. This stereotype was powered by 
either the belief that homosexuals seek to “recruit” children or that their lives were so enticing 
that children would embrace it as normal101. 
This was mostly prominent in the case of homosexual teachers. Parents were concerned 
that if their kids spent too much time with a homosexual, that they would grow up to be 
homosexuals as well102. In Safransky v. State Personnel Bd. (1974), the state court claimed that a 
teacher’s homosexuality impeded him from teaching the “orthodox” sexual behaviors 
(heterosexual) to his students when teaching about human sexuality103. This was because being 
gay made him approve of homosexual behavior and thus stood in the way of teaching 
homosexuality as “unorthodox”. Moreover, kids were impressionable, and his sexual orientation 
might make them believe homosexuality was acceptable. The Court wrote:
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“His discussions concerning his homosexual associations and activities in the presence 
of residents constituted an adverse influence to the proper performance of his position 
duties--namely, the projection of the orthodoxy of male heterosexuality. We are 
satisfied that such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The deleterious 
effect on proper job performance is obvious. An individual fulfilling the position of 
houseparent cannot discuss homosexuality in the presence of his wards without at
least communicating an idea of tacit approval of such action. The patients are all too 
vulnerable to accept as orthodox those ideas propounded by their houseparent.”104
Thus, the concept expressed that homosexuals can turn your children gay by simply being 
gay, which would show them it’s also appropriate to be gay. The case of Gaylord v. Tacoma 
School District n. 10 (1977) explained in the section above also showed that the Supreme Court 
held a stereotype that homosexuals were immoral and thus couldn’t possible teach efficiently, 
based on the definitions of homosexuality in encyclopedias like the New Catholic 
Encyclopedia105.
1.2 Homosexuals As Child Molesters And Sexual Psychopaths
This stereotype was often used to justify sodomy laws. The Miller Act of 1948 was the 
first response to a wave of concerns about child molestation106. The law reflected the views about 
homosexuality and sodomy, and took an emphasis on children, giving a high maximum penalty 
of 20 years to any individual caught sodomizing a minor107. The aim of these laws was to prevent 
homosexuals from turning into pedophilia, which was an apparently strong and viable threat.
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Socially, these beliefs were growing in intensity by the minute. Back in 1977, Anita Bryant 
successfully repealed a Dade County (FL) ordinance prohibiting anti-gay discrimination. During 
the process, she named her organization "Save Our Children," and claimed "a particularly 
deviant-minded [gay] teacher could sexually molest children."108 Even as late as in 2002, the 
Family Research Council managed to manipulate research and issue a false report claiming 
homosexuals account for one third of all child abuse cases109. Truth is, homosexuals are not 
prone to pedophilia, and no more prone than any heterosexual would be110. 
Cases involving sodomy, discrimination in the workforce, and even anti-homosexual 
immigration laws, all derived from the popular belief that homosexuals were sexual psychopaths, 
and more importantly, mentally ill. We already stated that before 1973 homosexuality was 
defined by the American Psychological Association as a mental illness or disease.111  This claim 
done by such a powerful medical authority gave rise to sufficient justification for countless of 
legal and social discriminatory policies and behaviors112. 
Nowadays, these claims have been overridden. The American Psychiatric Association, 
American Psychological Association, National Association for Mental Health, and the Surgeon 
General now all agree that homosexuality is not a mental illness113. Homosexuality involves the 
physical, mental, and emotional attraction to someone of the same-sex, and never been and never 
will be a deficiency in someone’s mental capacity or character. All sexual orientations are 
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respected as healthy and immutable by the APA, who has stated that “for nearly three decades, it 
has been known that homosexuality is not a mental illness. Medical and mental health 
professionals also now know that sexual orientation is not a choice and cannot be altered.”114
2. Gender-Roles And Homosexuality
Gender roles have existed for as long as history has been recorded. In America, the 
heterosexist paternalistic society has claimed for centuries that women and men should fit a 
certain criteria of traits and behaviors to be considered adequate within their gender. These too 
are stereotypes, but for heterosexuals. Men are stereotypically strong and powerful and women 
are docile and submissive. The problem arises when you encounter males who are attracted to 
other males, and females who are attracted to other females. Society then misconstrues 
homosexuality for gender-bending. It automatically assumes that being attracted to the same-
gender means one desires to be the opposite gender because the opposite gender is the one 
attracted to their gender in a hetero-normative society. Thus arise all the stereotypes about 
homosexuals and their gender-queerness. 
Gay men have often been seen as a weak link. They stereotypically present characteristics 
such as effeminate looks and mannerisms, weak figures, overly emotional reactions, heightened 
sexual drive, and impulsive behaviors among many others. Lesbians, on the other hand, are 
viewed as manly, man-haters, rude, crass, liberal, forceful, and unattractive115. A group of 
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researchers lead by Allan Gross in 1980 interviewed college students and found that they 
“believed gay men generally to be theatrical, gentle, and liberated, whereas heterosexual men 
were thought to be more aggressive, dominant, competitive, strong, and stable; the same students 
believed lesbians generally to be dominant, direct, forceful, strong, liberated, and 
nonconforming, whereas heterosexual women were perceived as more likely to be conservative 
and stable.116”
These stereotypes have kept men and women from education, work, military service, and 
other crucial aspects of life. Society as a whole has held countless of erroneous views on 
homosexuality, generalizing stereotypes instead of viewing each individual by their own 
personal characteristics and with their own set of personal behaviors and choices.
D. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF HOMOSEXUALS
What if you belonged to a group but had no way to tell who else was in it? What if your 
needs and interests as a member of such group were ignored, and society still wouldn’t care? 
What if the one quality that defined your inner core beliefs was the same quality politicians you 
trust were trying to hide or oppress? Being a homosexual does not change your citizenship status. 
As a gay American, one should be entitled to the same rights and considerations any other 
American does. And regardless of what society says at any given point in history, truth and 
justice seem to emerge for the underrepresented, which is what we’re hoping today for sexual 
orientation.
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1. Homosexuality In Congress
The proportional representation of homosexuals in Congress is extremely difficult to 
research and analyze, since the characteristic of sexual orientation is not by any means 
something that can be observed or “picked out” from an individual as an obvious fact, and thus 
how “proportional” their representation is varies according to how we interpret representation in 
the first place. Representation for this section will be analyzed by the quantity of homosexual 
representatives in Congress, the amount of homo-friendly Congressmen regardless of their 
personal sexual orientation, and lastly, the quantity and quality of legislation that Congress 
passes favoring and furthering the rights of homosexuals.
Sexual orientation cannot be measured or accounted for accurately since not everyone is 
open about his or her own sexual orientation. Countless men and women carry on with a lifetime 
of hidden identities, never admitting to the world and/or themselves their own sexual orientation, 
so how are we to ever know the truth if they don’t even know it for themselves? Moreover, the 
social stigma that accompanies sexual orientation does not make matter easier: if you will be 
socially prosecuted for “coming out”, then chances are you will stay “in the closet”. It is crucial 
to present this disclaimer in order to bring attention to the varying validity and availability of 
statistics. 
These statistics, both for the population at large and congress themselves, need to be 
taken into consideration with the knowledge that many, many individuals are not disclosing their 
true sexual orientation for fear, religion, culture, etc. The Williams Institute at the UCLA School 
of Law, estimates that: 9 million (about 3.8%) of Americans identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual or 
transgender (2011). The institute also found that bisexuals make up 1.8% of the population, 
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while 1.7% are gay or lesbian. Transgender adults make up 0.3% of the population117.  If roughly 
4% of the population openly identifies as anything but heterosexual, we can make a confident 
inference that the actual number would be higher if social stigmas and prejudices were not 
threatening those responding the survey.
This is particularly true for representatives in Congress. Here we have a group of men 
and women, highly educated and under a great amount of public pressure, who are looking to 
please the largest amount of constituents in order to be reelected. Chances are, the less 
controversy one raises about their own sexual orientation while in congress, the greater the 
opportunity to be reelected.  
There have been six openly LGB members in the history of Congress. Gerry Studds
(elected in 1972) became the first openly gay man when he publicly announced his sexuality in 
1982. Barney Frank (serving since 1981) first spoke publicly about his sexual orientation in 
1987. Steve Gunderson (elected in 1980 and outed in 1994) and Jim Kolbe (elected in 1984 and 
outed in 1996) are two other previous members of Congress who were openly gay. Republican 
representative Mark Foley's homosexuality was well-known in his district, though he did not 
serve openly in Congress and did not come out publicly until after his term ended. Current 
congresswoman Tammy Baldwin is the first and so far only open lesbian woman to win election 
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to Congress. In 1998, she became the first ever openly gay person to win election to Congress as 
a non-incumbent. Former California representative Michael Huffington is bisexual, but did not 
come out until after his term had ended. Jared Polis (who was elected in 2008 and assumed office 
on January 6, 2009) is the first openly gay man to have been elected to the House as a freshman. 
This means that about 1.4% of Congress is openly of another orientation besides 
heterosexual, whereas 3.8% of the population at large is. Both numbers are smaller than they 
should be, clearly, but it still raises the question of whether the interests of a group so 
fundamental to an individual’s persona are being prioritized by representatives in Congress. With 
so many anti-homosexual laws like DOMA, are we honestly to believe that the body of 
politicians is accurately representing the non-heterosexual constituency?
Sexual orientation as a group has a wide range of political interests that society, or 
representatives in particular, should try to cater to. As Virginia Sapiro118 explains that women 
should be entitled to a representation based on their gender, not only as individuals, because of 
their encompassing specific interests as women. In the same manner, homosexuals are a strong 
group of constituents with specific interests. Gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgender 
individuals have the exact same needs and political interests as any heterosexual individual 
would: they want the same rights as everyone else, they want to not be restricted or discriminated 
against on the basis of a personal trait, they want equality and fairness, they demand due process, 
the right to marry, to adopt, to live a happy and full life as any other American citizen. 
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2. Homosexuals And Lobbying
Some claims have been made that homosexuals do not constitute a powerless and insular 
minority119. These people claim that as history evolved, nowadays homosexuals have sufficient 
political power as a group to make changes through the legislative branch of government, either 
by political organizations, lobbyists, or social movements. It is worthy to point out the various 
advancements the legal and governmental system has had on sexual orientation discrimination.
We are slowly seeing progress, most increasingly in the last few years of the Obama 
administration. President Obama set great focus on the rights of homosexuals and transgendered 
individuals, and accomplished some fantastic policies: such as the repeal of DADT and the HHS 
hospital rights for same-sex couples. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), for 
example, was swayed by the president to implement rules that protect hospital patients’ right to 
choose their own visitors during a hospital stay, including a visitor who is a same-sex domestic 
partner. These rules now apply to all hospitals that participate in Medicare and Medicaid. The 
guidance also supports the right of patients to designate the person of their choice, including a 
same-sex partner, to make medical decisions on their behalf should they become incapacitated120.
But even noting the great advancements in gay rights, we still need to compare this to 
other suspect groups and their political powerlessness, given that as society changes so does the 
reach of each minority in policy decisions. African-Americans, for example, are a clearly more 
powerful minority than homosexuals are, but it would be irrational to claim they do not deserve 
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the special protection from the court under strict scrutiny anymore mere because their political 
reach has increased since the Civil Rights Movement121.
Moreover, while it is absolutely true that gay rights have seen much improvement from 
their abhorrent beginnings, this does not mean that homosexuals as a group are powerful enough 
to avoid discriminatory policies through legislative channels. Federal laws override state laws, so 
in practicality, not only could congress pass countless laws to protect this minority group, but 
they could also strike down existing ones. 
Laws could be passed to prevent future discrimination against sexual orientation. Anti-
bullying laws need to be passed to prevent the enormous rate of suicides. The Suicide Prevention 
Resource Center synthesized these studies and estimated that between 30 and 40% of LGB 
youth, depending on age and sex groups, have attempted suicide. The Report of the Secretary's 
Task Force on Youth Suicide (1989) found that homosexual kids were four times more prone to 
commit suicide than were other non-homosexual kids122. This is apparently due to higher levels 
of stress in homosexual kids being stigmatized by their heterosexual peers. "More than 34,000 
people die by suicide each year," making it "the third leading cause of death among 15 to 24 year 
olds with lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth attempting suicide up to four times more than their 
heterosexual peers"123. 
Anti-discrimination laws in the workforce could be implemented at a national level, 
although many cities and states already have them in place. While the Supreme Court has failed 
to set a consistent national policy regarding sexual orientation discrimination, many states and 
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municipalities have taken the lead in passing protections for homosexuals in areas such as 
employment and public accommodations. The first of these were passed in the early 1970s, 
subsequently hundreds of municipalities and many states have adopted anti-sexual orientation 
protections. Probably the most famous anti-discrimination sexual orientation law was Vermont's 
Civil Union Law, passed in the year 2000, which permits same-sex couples to enter into "civil 
union" relationships. The law, while not using the language of marriage, gives same-sex couples 
virtually all of the 300 or so state rights available to married couples. No other state gives same-
sex couples this sort of protection, but several other states currently have anti-discrimination 
laws and protection for homosexuals. For example, New Jersey, Minnesota, and Connecticut all 
have protections against discrimination in employment, public accommodation, housing, and 
credit.
Policy changes would be vast and potentially life changing for many Americans. If 
representation for sexual orientation would grow to a considerably tangible amount, we would be 




“Latin for ‘to stand by things decided’. Stare decisis is essentially the doctrine of 
precedent. Courts cite to stare decisis when an issue has been previously brought to the 
court and a ruling already issued. Generally, courts will adhere to the previous 
ruling.”124
This section proposes a legal analysis of previous court case decisions on gender as a 
suspect class and their rulings. The idea is to make a just comparison between the plight of 
gender and its goal to become a suspect class, and how the decisions of the court could easily be 
applied to that of homosexuals.
1. Reed v. Reed, Frontiero v. Richardson, Craig v. Boren, Romer v. Evans, and U.S. v. Virginia
In Reed v. Reed in 1971, the Court said that a “Classification must be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to 
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstances shall be treated alike.”125
State laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation classify homosexuals as a group 
with fewer rights than heterosexuals are afforded and promulgate the view of homosexuality as 
immoral only on basis of social views. This goes against the right of gays and lesbians to be 
treated as equals with other individuals in their similar qualification circumstances. 
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In Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) the Court, discussing gender under strict scrutiny, 
stated that “What differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical 
disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic 
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”126 Within that 
definition, sexual orientation should be considered a suspect group targeted for discrimination 
and protected under high scrutiny such as race or national origin, since it too has no effect on a 
person’s ability to contribute to society. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brennan in Frontiero said, “By 
ignoring the individual qualifications of particular applications, the challenged statue provided 
dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated.”127 All anti-homosexual 
legislation generalizes the homosexual population as immoral, unfit, undeserving, or inferior. In 
this particular case, the court showed their opposition to the practice of legally generalizing a 
social opinion, stating that “Statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of 
invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the 
actual capabilities of its individual members.”128
Needless to say, the Court has been against stereotypes within the law in countless of 
cases. In Reed, the court said that “laws containing overbroad, sex-based assumptions violate the 
equal protection clause”129, which they reiterated in Frontiero. In Craig v. Boren, the Court stated 
that “archaic and overbroad generalizations could not justify use of a gender line in determining 
eligibility for certain governmental entitlements. Similarly, increasingly outdated misconceptions 
concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the marketplace and world of ideas 
were rejected as loose-fitting characterizations incapable of supporting state statutory schemes 
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that were premised upon their accuracy”130. Misconception and stereotypes about homosexuals' 
morals/ethics and their capacities or abilities is by no means enough to create a legal policy 
against them, the same way it wasn't enough to stop women from working. 
Within the discrimination spectrum, the Supreme Court declared in Craig that,
“Classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”131 Anti-homosexual laws and 
policies lack an important governmental objective because the exclusion or discrimination 
against homosexuals has yet to be proven to be beneficial for any aspect of society. The Court, in 
U.S. v. Virginia (1996), said that “our precedent instructs that “benign” justifications proffered in 
defense of categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification must 
describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded.”132
In the sexual orientation case of Romer v. Evans in 1996, the Court stated that publicly 
approved Amendment 2 in Colorado (which banned homosexuals from seeking refuge against 
discrimination in any level of the state) “Has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, and […] it lacks the rational relationship to 
legitimate state interest”133, and that “the amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no 
others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids 
reinstatement of these laws and policies”134, which deemed it unconstitutional. Moreover “A law 
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to 
seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal 
sense... [L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage 
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imposed is born of animosity towards the class of persons affected. [..] It inflicts on the 
immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that 
may be claimed for it.”135 The Supreme Court made that statement with their opinion in Romer, 
and it is a clear-cut opposition to policies like DOMA.
Some even claim that allowing homosexuals to be a suspect class would generate too 
much frenzy. That the Supreme Court would have to invalidate countless laws and its 
repercussions would be too far-reaching and revolutionary to feasibly manage. But this excuse is, 
as the Supreme Court mandated in Reed v. Reed, unconstitutional, “To give a mandatory 
preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the 
elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice 
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [..] Administrative 
convenience is no justification for violating the Constitution.”136
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court set forth the qualifications a group of individuals should entail in 
order to be considered a suspect class and thus granted special protection under the 14th
amendment. These are a history of purposeful discrimination, immutability of traits, incorrect 
stereotypes, and political powerlessness. As presented in the sections above, there should be no 
possible doubt in the reader’s mind that homosexuality as a group of citizens fulfills all the 
criteria the Courts have set forth. Homosexuality, moreover, fulfills the indicia just as deeply and 
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widely as any other suspect class recognized by the courts has before.  Even if some of the 
qualifications are not satisfactory to the reader, for whatever reason or prejudice, it should be out 
of question from an objective standpoint that in the least homosexuality should be deserving of 
quasi-suspect status and protected under heightened scrutiny. The Court, as it stands, shows a 
bias against homosexuals by not considering their case as worthy of the same statutory review as 
do other groups. It is the aim of this essay to broaden the views of the reader and reach out to the 
community as a whole to educate all citizens of the reality of this injustice.
1. Commentary Of Personal Opinion
People hold pillars of rational, ethical and moral fundamentals deep in the core of their 
personality. And just as much as someone would find it disturbing to their core values to allow 
gay marriage or gay adoptions, it would just as much harm the fundamental values and core 
sense of identity of a homosexual not to be able to marry the person they love or raise their 
children together as legal guardians. I don’t believe there are negative aspects of allowing higher 
sexual orientation representation and pursuing laws that would benefit them, but I respect others 
who believe there would be. In my opinion, gay-friendly policies would simply improve society. 
We are endowed to our fellow countrymen to pursue equal opportunities and achieve the ability 
of happiness for all Americans alike. We hold in our hands the ability to grant a human being a 
right that would change their lives, a right that could hand them equality and the opportunity to 
love, leading to better human beings and a greater sense of human charity. Regardless of your 
religion or political affiliation, as human being we are inherently wired to help one another in 
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order to become better individuals. If the negative aspects are minimal, and the positive are 
abysmal, then there’s no excuse not to allow someone the right to be comfortable with their 
identity both internally to themselves and externally with the world.
Forty years ago, interracial marriage was illegal in most states in our country. Anti-
miscegenation statues prohibit those of different races from professing their love to one another 
and marry one another. What now would appall most educated citizens on the United States (not 
allowing individuals to marry just because of their race) was once completely acceptable. It 
wasn’t until Loving v. Virginia in 1967 that the Supreme Court ended all race-based legal 
restrictions on marriage. Does this mean we blame all interracial couples who tried to marry 
before such law was passed? Were they immoral human beings for wanting to share their love 
with one another? Would it change your mind to know our president was born from an interracial 
marriage? How about if you were aware that such marriage was in fact before Loving v. 
Virginia, when most states agreed that such union was in fact immoral and illegal? We’ve come 
long ways from discrimination on the basis of race, even on the basis of gender, then why can’t 
we grow as a nation and stop this unfair treatment of homosexuals? What was once considered a 
horrific sin is now viewed as a common behavior to express two free individual’s love. Let’s be 
proactive and think ahead, otherwise, we will most certainly look back on our ignorance with 
regret in the future when gays are thought of the same way. 
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